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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress has estimated that the number of people who have been 
sexually assaulted in America’s prisons over the past twenty years tops 
one million.1  Some inmates are sexually assaulted by guards, and some 
by other inmates, facilitated by guards.2  The problem is so rampant that 
Congress enacted the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.3  Though the 
State has a constitutional obligation to “provide humane conditions of 
confinement,” sometimes it fails.4  To receive compensation for or relief 
from such harm, a prisoner must conform to the guidelines provided in 
 1. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2401 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2) (Supp. III 2003)). 
 2. Id. at 2402. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (Supp. III 2003); see Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2401 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Although this introductory example focuses on sexual assault, a 
variety of federal rights might be violated in a prison environment.  Sexual assault is one 
such violation, but it is not the focus of this Note. 
 4. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2401–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). 
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the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),5 which requires an 
inmate to file a grievance for his injury with the very administration 
responsible for not providing humane conditions.6  Additionally, a prisoner 
who has just suffered the assault has a limited time in which to lodge 
his complaint, generally no more than fifteen days, and in nine states 
only between two and five days.7
In addition to the strict procedural requirements imposed by the 
PLRA, case law interprets it to prevent injured inmates from filing 
federal lawsuits until they exhaust the available administrative remedies.  
Significantly, a recent Supreme Court decision imposes a procedural 
default rule: when an inmate does not file or appeal his grievance within 
the specified time limits, he is barred from receiving any remedy via 
federal suit, regardless of the reason for missing the deadlines.8
This Note evaluates that June 22, 2006 Supreme Court decision, 
Woodford v. Ngo.9  At issue in Woodford was whether the PLRA requires 
proper exhaustion or simple exhaustion.  A proper exhaustion requirement 
precludes an inmate from filing a lawsuit in federal court unless he has 
proceeded through each step of his prison’s grievance procedure while 
 5. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000) [hereinafter 
PLRA].  The PLRA refers an inmate to the procedures his detention center requires. 
 6. This Note refers to prisons and prisoners or inmates.  The PLRA applies to 
prisons, jails, and other correctional facilities, including juvenile detention centers at 
both the state and federal level.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought 
with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility . . . .”) (emphasis added).  In this Note, the 
words prisons, prisoners, and inmates include all facilities and persons the PLRA covers. 
 7. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for the Jerome N. 
Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae app. at    
2–5, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL 304573 at *28.  
The Brief includes a chart which lists time limitations for prisoners to file their initial 
complaint.  Indiana has the shortest time limit among adult correctional institutions: two 
days.  Id.  North Carolina institutions have both the longest and shortest time periods: 
one year in the North Carolina Department of Correction, and twenty-four hours in the 
North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  Id.; see 
also Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae at 6, n.1, 
Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL 284226 at *6 n.1.  
Prisoners are responsible for discovering their institutions’ administrative exhaustion 
requirements.  See infra note 134.  Although the Introduction offers rape as an example 
of an inhumane condition about which a prisoner might file a grievance, this Note will 
not discuss rape in any detail. 
 8. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382–93. 
 9. 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006). 




meeting all procedural requirements, including deadlines.10  On the other 
hand, simple exhaustion, or exhaustion simpliciter, permits an inmate to 
file a lawsuit as long as the administrative grievance procedure is no 
longer available, provided that he has not intentionally circumvented the 
administrative process.11  If an inmate is not able to proceed through the 
administrative process because he has not met the procedural requirements, 
including time limits, he has exhausted his remedies and may file suit in 
federal court.  The Supreme Court’s holding in Woodford rejects simple 
exhaustion and instead creates a procedural default rule which bars an 
inmate from filing a lawsuit in federal court absent proper exhaustion.12  
However, the dissent provides a better reading of the statute.  The dissent 
posits that the PLRA requires simple exhaustion, which only prohibits 
federal actions by an inmate who intentionally circumvents the administrative 
process’s procedural requirements.13
Part II of this Note explains the statute at issue in Woodford, examines 
its history, discusses the details of the case, and outlines the majority’s 
main arguments for creating a procedural default rule.  Part III explains 
why these arguments are flawed and why both public policy and the 
plain language of the PLRA demand a simple exhaustion rule.  Part IV 
 10. Errors that might prevent a prisoner from meeting all procedural requirements 
include using the incorrect form, sending correct documentation to the wrong official 
within the appropriate time limitations, or failing to name an official in a complaint even 
though administrators have actual knowledge of the official involved.  Brief of the 
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 7, at 26–27.  The majority does not 
explicitly define what kinds of procedural errors would result in a forfeiture of the right 
to file a federal lawsuit.  Instead, it focuses on “critical procedural rules” without defining 
what those might be.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2386 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance 
with . . . critical procedural rules . . . .”).  The dissent spends more time discussing the 
types of procedural errors that would preclude filing a lawsuit, specifically expressing 
concern that under the majority’s interpretation of the PLRA, inmates who make 
“hypertechnical procedural error[s]” will be unable to bring a lawsuit.  Id. at 2404 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  The Court does not offer a brightline definition of “critical 
procedural rules,” and its holding leaves administrative procedure to the discretion of the 
individual prisons.  Thus, the examples provided by the ACLU Brief seem legitimate 
illustrations of what the future may hold.
 11. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384 (“Under this [‘exhaustion simpliciter’] interpretation, 
the reason why administrative remedies are no longer available is irrelevant.”).
 12. The term procedural default comes from habeas law; administrative law has 
not used this terminology in the past.  Id. at 2387.  The Court repeatedly refers to the 
imposition of a bar to filing federal suit absent proper exhaustion as a procedural default 
rule.  See id. at 2392–93.  This Note’s references to a procedural default rule and proper 
exhaustion are synonymous.  Based on the Court’s reading of the PLRA, when a prisoner 
has not properly exhausted administrative remedies, he is barred from filing a federal 
lawsuit.  This is called a procedural default because the default rule requires the prisoner 
to follow proper procedure. 
 13. Id. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Under a simple exhaustion reading, the 
dissent notes that courts could dismiss cases using abstention principles, which “allow 
federal district courts to dismiss suits brought by prisoners who have deliberately 
bypassed available state remedies.”  Id.
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explains the best reading of the PLRA exhaustion language and applies 
the simple exhaustion rule to the facts of Mr. Ngo’s case to demonstrate 
how it best leads to just results.  Ultimately, this Note concludes the Court 
improperly interpreted the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement 
by engrafting a procedural default rule onto its simple exhaustion language. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. Administrative Procedure Background of Woodford v. Ngo 
Prison officials placed Mr. Ngo in administrative segregation for 
allegedly inappropriate activity in the prison chapel.14  Two months 
later, the prisoner returned to the general population.15  Upon his return, 
prison officials repeatedly prohibited him from participating in “special 
programs,” including religious activities.16  After six months of attempting 
to participate without success, Mr. Ngo filed a grievance.17  Prison 
officials rejected his grievance as untimely because it arrived more than 
fifteen working days after the first time they imposed the restriction.18  
 14. Id. at 2383 (majority opinion).  No adjudicative body ever found Mr. Ngo 
guilty of violating any prison rules, including any which would lead to administrative 
segregation.  Brief of Respondent at 1, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05-
416), 2006 WL 271821.  The facts available do not indicate exactly what allegedly 
“inappropriate activity” was involved.  Further, while one may wonder why Mr. Ngo 
was serving a prison sentence, this information, however interesting, is not relevant to 
the prisoner’s civil rights in a § 1983 action.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 15. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2383. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2384.  This case involves California’s grievance procedure.  Id. at 2383–
84 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084.3(c)(6), 3084.6(c) (2004)).  The California 
grievance procedure requires an inmate to follow an administrative process to address his 
complaints.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.2 (2007).  With some exceptions, the 
process requires an inmate to begin by attempting to informally resolve his dispute.  Id. 
§ 3084.2(b); see also id. §§ 3084.5(a)(3), 3084.7 (providing exceptions to the informal 
review requirement).  As evidence of this attempt at informal resolution, when “an 
appellant attempts to resolve an appeal at the informal level . . . [t]he employee shall 
report the action taken in the response space provided on the appeal form, and shall sign 
and date the form.”  Id. § 3084.5(a)(2).  The Code of Regulations refers to Form 602, 
which is used throughout the administrative process.  Id. § 3084.2(a).  The statute 
requires “evidence of an attempt to obtain informal level review . . . before an appeal 
may be accepted for formal review.”  Id. § 3084.5(a)(1); see also id. §§ 3084.5(a)(3), 
3084.7 (providing exceptions).  If a prisoner is dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal 
review, or if the State waives such a review, an inmate must pursue the formal review 
process.  Id. § 3084.5(b). 
 18. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384.  Pursuant to the California grievance procedure, 
an inmate initiates the formal process by completing part D of Form 602, explaining why 




Mr. Ngo filed a second complaint, arguing his previous grievance was 
timely because the restriction from participation in religious acts was 
ongoing.19  Prison officials rejected this claim as well.20
B.  Litigation History of Woodford v. Ngo 
After unsuccessfully appealing the rejection internally, Mr. Ngo sued 
California correctional officials for violating his civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court.21  His complaint stated: “‘Two 
appeals submitted.  San Quentin Appeals Office refused to process claiming 
time constraints for filing not met.  However, my righ[ts] are still being 
he is dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal process.  He submits this form to the 
appeals coordinator within fifteen working days.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c).  
The reviewer completes part E of the Form to inform the inmate of the outcome of the 
appeal, and he returns it to the inmate within another thirty working days.  CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(2). 
 19. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he denial of 
respondent’s capacity to engage in religious activities was clearly ongoing, and thus had 
occurred within the prison’s 15-day statute of limitations.”).  California procedure allows 
an inmate whose second request has been denied to request a second level of review.  He 
first completes part F of Form 602 and submits it within fifteen days of the decision.  
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.5(c), (e)(1).  The prison warden has twenty working 
days to provide a decision in a letter, which he attaches to the form.  Id. § 3084.6(b)(3). 
 20. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384.  Typically, if a prisoner in California is unhappy 
with an outcome that is based on the complaint’s merits, he must explain his dissatisfaction in 
writing on part H and mail it to the Director of the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation within fifteen working days.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.5(e)(2).  
If an inmate does not meet the required timelines, his appeal may properly be denied.  Id. 
§ 3084.3(c)(6).  In this case, Mr. Ngo’s complaint was denied for procedural problems, 
not because his claim lacked merit.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384. 
 21. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384.  Mr. Ngo was not able to pursue review to the 
third level because the officials denied relief on procedural grounds.  If he had been able 
to carry his claim through all three review levels, or if the requested relief were provided, 
Mr. Ngo would have exhausted his administrative remedies.  United States District 
Courts in California have held that when an inmate’s requested relief has been granted, 
he has exhausted the administrative process.  Brady v. Attygala, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 
1023 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Clement v. Dep’t of Corrs., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1106 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002).  Mr. Ngo filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that: 
   Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added).  Mr. Ngo claimed a § 1983 violation alleging 
prison officials were depriving him of his First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .”).  Prisoners’ religious free exercise is also statutorily 
protected by the Protection of Religious Exercise in Land Use and by Institutionalized 
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000) [hereinafter RLUIPA].  See also Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720–21 (2005). 
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denied on an ongoing basis.’”22  Prison officials moved to dismiss the 
case, claiming the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies 
because he neglected to file his grievance within the specified time 
period.  The district court granted the dismissal.23
The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, explaining that the prisoner 
had fully exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by law, 
because there were no administrative remedies available once the statute 
of limitations expired.24  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari because of a split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.25  The 
Ninth and Sixth Circuits had held that where administrative remedies 
were no longer available, regardless of the reason, the administrative 
process was exhausted.26  Four other Circuits required an inmate to follow 
all procedural requirements in order to exhaust the administrative 
process.27  This meant that if an inmate did not file an administrative 
grievance within the prescribed time period, he would be barred from 
seeking relief in federal court as well. 
In a split decision, with Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas joining Justice Alito’s opinion and Justice Breyer concurring, 
the Supreme Court held that “proper exhaustion of administrative 
 22. Supplemental Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 2–3, Ngo v. 
Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1604), 2003 WL 23525363. 
 23. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384.  Though not discussed in the Court’s decision, 
the California Code of Regulations does not identify which act tolls the time limits.  
Here, officials repeatedly restricted Mr. Ngo’s participation in religious activities and 
claimed the fifteen-day period began the first time they imposed the restriction.  Id. at 
2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  However, Mr. Ngo did file his grievance within fifteen 
days of the most recent restriction. 
 24. Id. at 2384 (majority opinion); Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 
2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006). 
 25. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. 2378. 
 26. Id.; Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 
2378 (2006); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726–27 (6th Cir. 2003).  But see 
Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (reversing a similar holding in Ngo v. 
Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 27. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2384; Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1159 
(11th Cir. 2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 
1025 (7th Cir. 2002).  Interestingly, though the Supreme Court cites the Seventh Circuit 
case Pozo v. McCaughtry as supporting the requirement for a procedural default rule, an 
Illinois district court case notes that there is a “Perez exception” provided for in dictum 
which allows a prisoner seeking only monetary damages to forego the administrative 
exhaustion where this remedy is not available through the prison administrative process.  
Nitz v. French, No. 01 C 0229, 2001 WL 747445, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2001). 




remedies is necessary”28 and created a procedural default rule.  Justice 
Stevens authored the dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg.29  
To understand the Court’s decision, it is necessary to become familiar 
with the PLRA, which this Note discusses in the next section. 
C.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) and                              
Its Predecessors 
1.  Prior to the PLRA, Courts Had Discretion Regarding              
Administrative Exhaustion 
Before 1960, prisoners could not file suit under §1983.30  During the 
1960s, though, courts began recognizing prisoner rights.31  This came 
about because of “[t]he combination of increased judicial activism, 
abrogation of long-held legal doctrine, and the obviously deplorable 
conditions of many state penal institutions” which “opened the door to 
prisoners seeking legal redress through §1983 actions.”32  Within a 
decade of providing inmates with access to federal court, the Supreme 
Court began limiting that access by taking a more deferential approach 
toward prison officials’ decisions regarding grievances.33  Despite this, 
between 1972 and 1991 the number of prisoner cases grew from 
approximately 3000 to more than 26,000.34  This can be partly explained 
by the number of people incarcerated, which nearly quadrupled.35  In 
1980, to help deal with the increasing number of suits, Congress 
 28. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence is brief.  He 
explains that his concurrence rests on his belief that Congress “intended the term 
‘exhausted’ to ‘mean what the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion 
means proper exhaustion.’”  Id. at 2393 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting majority 
opinion).  However, Justice Breyer departs from the majority because he believes there 
should be exceptions to the proper exhaustion rule, as there are in both administrative 
and habeas law.  Id.  He notes that the Third and Fourth Circuits have interpreted proper 
exhaustion in the PLRA not to be absolute, so that when prisoners “can demonstrate 
cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default” or when the rule would “result in 
a miscarriage of justice,” it would not apply.  Id. (quoting Stevens’s dissenting opinion) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 30. Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away 
With More Than Just Crunchy Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 208 (2004) 
(citing Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision 
of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 422 (1993)).  Prior to 1960, an inmate could not sue 
prison officials for inhumane or unsafe prison conditions.  Eisenberg, supra, at 422. 
 31. Chen, supra note 30. 
 32. Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 425.  This change in law allowed a prisoner to file 
a lawsuit challenging the conditions of confinement in which the state forced him to 
reside. 
 33. Id. at 426. 
 34. Id. at 435. 
 35. Id. 
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amended the Civil Rights Act to permit courts to require administrative 
exhaustion.36
This law, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA),37 
did not appear to reduce prison litigation.  CRIPA permitted district 
courts to require inmates to exhaust administrative procedures before 
filing suit.38  However, states needed to meet certification requirements 
for their grievance procedures to qualify for the exhaustion requirement, 
and many states opted not to request certification.39  Nevertheless, some 
courts exercised judicial discretion to eliminate meritless claims in other 
ways.  But their methods lacked uniformity and had little impact on total 
litigation.40  In 1995, 40,569 state prisoner civil rights lawsuits were 
filed in federal court.41  In response to concerns over the number of 
lawsuits, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act.42
 36. Id. at 436; Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 
(1980) [hereinafter CRIPA], superseded by PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996). 
 37. CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1980), superseded by PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 
(Supp. II 1996). 
 38. Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 543 (2002). 
 39. Id. at 543 n.43.  To receive certification, a state attorney general had to 
demonstrate his state’s administrative proceedings met specific standards outlined by 
what was then § 1997e.  Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State 
Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935, 939 (1986).  
Congress intended the certification requirement to ensure prisoners would not be 
precluded from filing a federal suit unless they had adequate due process at the state 
administrative level.  See id. at 937. 
 40. Mathews, supra note 38, at 543–45 (explaining the various measures courts 
took to curb frivolous prisoner lawsuits). 
 41. Adam Slutsky, Note, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 
2294 (2005) (citing Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat. 349, 352 (1980) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e (2000))).  It is worth noting that “[w]hile the number of prisoner cases 
can be accurately determined, the merit of such actions is not amenable to such objective 
determination.”  Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 436–37.  Thus, while the number of 
lawsuits continued to grow, it is not clear that the total increase in lawsuits met with an 
even greater increase in meritless claims. 
 42. See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006).  The PLRA’s legislative 
history provides little record to analyze.  As one writer explained: 
Congress passed the PLRA as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated Rescission 
and Appropriations Act of 1996.  The debate and legislative processes leading 
to the passage of the PLRA were hasty, one-sided, and did not give much 
thought to the possible ramifications on prisoners’ constitutional rights.  After 
only one week of debate, the House passed its version on July 26, 1995.  
Similarly, the Senate debated the legislation for a mere five days before 
approving it.  The bare legislative history clearly shows that there was “hardly 
the type of thorough review that a measure of this scope deserve[d].” 




2. The PLRA Makes Administrative Exhaustion Mandatory 
Congress enacted the PRLA43 to reduce the number of meritless 
lawsuits filed by prison inmates.44  Support for the PRLA began to build 
when attorneys general publicly promoted the notion that prisoner 
litigation was often frivolous.  They generated a list of top ten frivolous 
lawsuits and distributed it to the media and Congress.45  Four attorneys 
general wrote a letter published by the New York Times complaining that 
taxpayers were unjustifiably footing the bill “for the special privileges 
provided to prisoners when they file their suits.”46  Public reaction was 
strong, and it prompted creation of the PLRA to reduce frivolous 
prisoner lawsuits.47  However, the information the attorneys general 
provided the public was misleading.48  For example, among the list of 
Chen, supra note 30, at 209–10 (footnotes omitted).  For a thorough explanation of the 
Act’s legislative process and why it was not a thorough review, see Jennifer Winslow, 
Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement Bars 
Meritorious Lawsuits: Was it Meant to? 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1659–60 (2002). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 1996). 
 44. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006); Moore v. Smith, 18 F. Supp. 
2d 1360, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (“Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA) to ‘stem the tide of meritless prisoner cases.’” (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7526–27 
(daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl))). 
 45. See Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2378 
(2006); accord Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in 
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) (“[T]he attorneys general of the states 
adopted the tactic of condemning all prisoner litigation as frivolous.  Their national 
association canvassed the attorneys general for their lists of top ten frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits and widely disseminated to the press the lists the association collected.”). 
 46. Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts From Frivolous 
Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 26.  The letter states: 
Typical of such suits is the case where an inmate sued, claiming cruel and 
unusual punishment because he received one jar of chunky and one jar of 
creamy peanut butter after ordering two jars of chunky from the prison 
canteen.  Or the inmate who sued because there were no salad bars or brunches 
on weekends and holidays.  Or the case where a prisoner is suing New York 
because his prison towels are white instead of his preferred beige. 
Id. 
 47. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: 
The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1772 (2003); see also 
Mathews, supra note 38, at 546–47 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (explaining the goal was not to prevent legitimate 
claims)). 
 48. The peanut butter case was not actually about the type of peanut butter at all, 
but instead it was about the prison debiting the inmate’s prison account for a jar of 
(creamy) peanut butter which the inmate did not consume and returned.  Hon. Jon O. 
Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. 
REV. 519, 521 (1996).  Likewise, the towel color case, as one might imagine, was not 
about the color of the inmate’s towels at all.  In fact, the prisoner’s complaint was that 
the prison confiscated towels his family had sent him, then punished him for receiving 
the package.  Id. (citing Rivera v. New York, No. 90811 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. filed Dec. 21, 
1994)). 
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frivolous cases was one involving the absence of a salad bar in prison 
facilities on weekends and holidays.49  The salad bar case was not really 
about the availability of salad bars on weekends and holidays.  Instead, it 
was a class action suit brought by forty-three inmates complaining of 
“major prison deficiencies including overcrowding, forced confinement 
of prisoners with contagious diseases, lack of proper ventilation, lack of 
sufficient food, and food contaminated by rodents.”50  The inmates mentioned 
the salad bar in passing as part of their allegations that the prison 
administrators had neglected inmates’ nutritional needs.51  Nevertheless, 
the complaint about the absence of a salad bar was cited during congressional 
consideration of various proposals.52
The PLRA’s goal is to bring inmate litigation under control, and it 
does so via several provisions, including a requirement that district 
courts dismiss claims which clearly lack merit,53 a prohibition against 
claims for emotional distress absent physical harm,54 and restrictions on 
claims for attorneys’ fees.55  Most significantly, the PLRA requires that: 
“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
§1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”56  This change is particularly 
 49. Vacco, supra note 46, at 26. 
 50. Newman, supra note 48, at 521 (citing Tyler v. Carnahan, No. 4 94 CV 
0017WSB (E.D. Mo. filed Dec. 17, 1993)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 522. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2000) (“The court shall on its own motion or on the 
motion of a party dismiss any action brought . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is 
frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .”). 
 54. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in 
a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while 
in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
 55. § 1997e(d) (“In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 
1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded except [within certain limitations] . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 56. § 1997e(a).  A prisoner is responsible for ascertaining his facility’s 
administrative grievance procedure, which might not be a statewide program.  See 
Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1352–55 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a prisoner 
must exhaust the administrative procedure outlined in a prison handbook but not 
formally adopted by the state’s department of corrections). 




significant because it adds a requirement that a prisoner must seek relief 
via his prison’s grievance processes prior to filing suit.57
D.  The Majority’s Rationale for Establishing a                              
Procedural Default Rule 
The Supreme Court sought to determine whether a prisoner could 
satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement with an untimely or procedurally 
defective administrative grievance or appeal.  It held an inmate could 
not.58  This created a procedural default rule which precludes an inmate 
from filing a lawsuit claiming violation of federal law if he has not 
properly exhausted the administrative process.59  The majority’s rationale 
for this court-created rule can be broken into five basic arguments.  First, 
the new procedural default rule will protect the prison administration’s 
authority.60  Second, the exhaustion requirement as interpreted will 
promote efficiency by reducing the quantity of lawsuits and improving 
their quality.61  Third, requiring proper exhaustion fits the general 
scheme of the PLRA.62  Next, reading a procedural default rule into the 
PLRA’s requirements is permissible because the Court took similar 
action with respect to habeas corpus petitions.63 Finally, the majority 
 57. Prior to the current version of the PLRA, exhaustion only applied to § 1983 
violations.  Moore v. Smith, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1998).  The courts also 
had discretion to determine whether applying the exhaustion requirement was in the 
interests of justice.  Id. (citing Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam)).  The earlier provision required the court to evaluate the grievance procedure to 
make sure it complied with minimum acceptable standards.  Id.; see Woodford v. Ngo, 
126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002) 
(explaining the prior version of the PLRA made exhaustion discretionary but allowable 
only if the grievance system met federal standards and was “appropriate in the interests 
of justice”)).  The new version does not require the prison’s grievance procedures to 
meet any requirements, and it applies to suit under any federal law, not just § 1983 
violations.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382–83. 
 58. Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2382. 
 59. Prior to this holding, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits required mere simple 
exhaustion; this approach allows a suit to proceed when administrative remedies are no 
longer available due to missed deadlines or other procedural errors.  See supra note 26 
and accompanying text. 
 60. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2385. 
 61. Id.  The Court points out, for example, that litigation quality improves when 
there is a useful record produced by the administrative process.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 2387. 
 63. Id.  Each of the majority’s arguments can be characterized as supporting public 
policy as identified by other statutes with similar purposes.  The dissent points out: “Of 
course, if the majority were serious that ‘what matters is not whether proper exhaustion 
was necessary to reach [policy goals], but whether proper exhaustion was mandated by 
Congress,’ ante, at 2388 n.4, its opinion would not rest almost entirely on policy 
arguments.”  Id. at 2400 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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contends the statutory language connotes proper exhaustion.64 This 
section explains each of these arguments in turn, and Part III explains 
the problems inherent in each. 
1.  Proper Exhaustion Requirements Protect Administrative Authority 
The majority opinion explains that an administrative exhaustion 
requirement protects administrative agency authority.65  By giving an 
agency the opportunity to correct its own mistakes, administrative 
exhaustion discourages disregard for agencies’ procedures.66  A procedural 
default requires a prisoner to file a complaint and follow the proper 
channels, even in instances where he may prefer bypassing the 
administrator by filing a suit directly in federal court.67  The Court 
promotes agency authority by requiring inmates to “give the agency a 
fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims.”68  Moreover, by 
 64. Id. (majority opinion) (“The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strongly suggests that 
the PLRA uses the term ‘exhausted’ to mean what the term means in administrative law, 
where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.”); see also id. at 2391 (discussing the use of 
the term until and the present tense in the statute). 
 65. The Court’s general discussion of administrative exhaustion does not 
distinguish proper exhaustion from simple exhaustion in concluding that it protects 
agency authority.  See id. at 2385.  However, the majority goes on to define proper 
exhaustion as “demand[ing] compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical 
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without 
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”  Id. at 2386.  The 
question of what is proper is the focus of the decision in this case.  Although the 
majority requires compliance with deadlines and other rules, the dissenting opinion 
disagrees.  Id. at 2386 n.2, 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Whether or not the goal of 
administrative authority can be achieved through simple exhaustion is discussed in Part 
III.A. of this Note.  See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
 66. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2385.  The majority does not explicitly connect 
providing prison administration with an opportunity to correct its mistakes and 
discouraging disregard for procedures.  However, this seems to be a fair reading based 
on the Court’s presentation of this rationale.
 67. See id.  The majority’s initial discussion of the benefits of preserving 
administrative authority and promoting efficiency via exhaustion of the administrative 
procedure does not distinguish procedurally proper exhaustion from simple exhaustion.  
See id.  Yet its citations and conclusion indicate that when the majority refers to the 
advantages of requiring administrative exhaustion, it means proper exhaustion.  See id. 
(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining 
exhaustion “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so 
that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”)).
 68. Id.  The majority contends a procedural default rule eliminates “unwarranted 
federal-court interference with the administration of prisons” and provides corrections 
officials the time to address complaints prior to the initiation of a federal suit.  Id. at 
2387. 




requiring proper exhaustion, the Court acknowledges that administrative 
systems need structure to function properly; the procedural requirements 
of the grievance process serve that purpose.69  The majority contends a 
procedural default rule respects administrative authority and encourages 
inmates to do the same.70
2.  Proper Exhaustion Promotes Efficiency 
The Court also argues that proper exhaustion promotes efficient 
resolution of complaints.71  Under the majority’s reading of the PLRA, a 
prisoner must completely and properly exhaust the administrative remedies 
prior to filing suit in federal court.72  This exhaustion requirement will 
likely reduce the number of lawsuits because prison officials will address 
some grievances and grant the relief requested, making it unnecessary 
for those prisoners to file suit.73  Alternatively, the grievance process 
 69. Id. at 2386 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s 
deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function 
effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”). 
 70. The Court does not explicitly argue these goals cannot be met by a simple 
exhaustion rule.  Rather, it explains how they can be met with a procedural default rule.  
Id. at 2385–86. 
 71. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)); see also Porter v. 
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (“In some instances, corrective action taken in 
response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the 
inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation.”). 
 72. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2385.  The PLRA leaves the details of the process up 
to the individual prison systems.   See Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1352–54 
(3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that Congress intended an inmate to use his prison’s 
administrative procedure, whether or not adopted by a state administrative agency).  
Most systems include a statute of limitations for filing a grievance and commencing the 
administrative process.  These deadlines exist to aid prison officials in being fair, 
consistent, and orderly.  Brief of Petitioners at 24–25, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 
(2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL 3598180.  Additionally, the deadlines help ensure 
investigations based on fresh memories and improve a prisoner’s opportunities for timely 
remedial action.  Id. at 25. 
 73. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388.  One issue that Woodford does not seem to 
address is the definition of exhaustion.  Previous cases have defined exhaustion to 
include both completion of the administrative process and granting of relief.  For 
example, in one California district court case, an inmate whose eye was damaged in a 
fight used the administrative grievance process to request an appointment with an 
ophthalmologist outside the prison.  Brady v. Attygala, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1017–18 
(C.D. Cal. 2002).  Prison officials granted his request at the second level of formal 
review.  Brady then filed suit in federal court for monetary compensation, a remedy 
unavailable through the grievance process.  Id. at 1019 (“The grievance system, 
however, allows for the award of prospective relief, but not monetary damages (aside 
from a nominal amount for property damage).”).  The court held that administrative 
procedure does not require an inmate to appeal a favorable decision.  Id. at 1022.  This 
suggests that where a request is granted, the inmate has exhausted the administrative 
remedies available and met the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  As one Illinois federal 
court noted, “It would be a strange rule that an inmate who has received all he expects or 
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may persuade a prisoner not to file suit because he is unlikely to receive 
the requested relief in court.74  Additionally, the majority explains that a 
procedural default rule improves the quality of cases because the short 
time period in which a prisoner may file his complaint ensures quick 
identification of witnesses while memories remain fresh.75  The Court 
explains that even “where a controversy survives administrative review, 
exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record 
for subsequent judicial consideration.”76  Such a record aids the court, 
improving the quality of litigation.77
reasonably can expect must nevertheless continue to appeal, even where there is nothing 
to appeal.”  Nitz v. French, No. 01 C 0229, 2001 WL 747445, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 
2001). 
 74. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2385 (“In some cases, claims are settled at the 
administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the agency convince the losing 
party not to pursue the matter in federal court.” (citing Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 
37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969))).  Though the goal of the 
PLRA is to reduce the number of meritless lawsuits, the majority opinion appears to 
focus on reducing the overall number of lawsuits inmates file in federal court.  See infra 
Part III.B.1. 
 75. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388.  Permitting inmates to exhaust administrative remedies 
beyond a strict time limitation makes sense in light of the brief period of time provided 
to a prisoner to file his grievance.  See Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services 
Organization, supra note 7, app. at 2–5. 
 76. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).  In Woodford, the Court does 
not discuss the goal of protecting administrative authority specifically.  Instead, the 
Woodford Court refers to its earlier decision in McCarthy v. Madigan.  Woodford, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2388.  Though the PLRA superceded the Court’s McCarthy holding, the rationale 
remains valid.  In McCarthy, the Supreme Court explains that exhaustion doctrine shows 
deference to congressional delegation of authority in coordinating the branches of 
government.  McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145, superseded by PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. II 
1996).  In McCarthy, the Court explained: “[T]he exhaustion doctrine recognizes the 
notion . . . that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the 
programs that Congress has charged them to administer.”  Id.  Further, the Court points 
out that “[e]xhaustion concerns apply with particular force” to agencies exercising 
discretionary power or special expertise.  Id.  Finally, the Court notes that it is a 
“commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency ought to have an opportunity 
to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled 
into federal court.”  Id.  Allowing individuals to bypass the administrative process may 
weaken an agency’s effectiveness “by encouraging disregard of its procedures.”  Id.  
(citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969)).  The Woodford Court specifically 
emphasizes the strength a state has in its prison system: “[I]t is ‘difficult to imagine an 
activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up 
with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.’”  
Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 
(1973)).  However, in comparing habeas law to the PLRA exhaustion requirement, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the state’s interests are not the same: “A state’s sovereignty . . . is less 
threatened when a federal court reviews a ‘non-criminal state administrative process’ for 




3. Proper Exhaustion Eliminates Frivolous Lawsuits 
The majority’s third main argument for creating a procedural default 
rule is that it promotes the public policy intended by the PLRA, because 
this rule eliminates meritless lawsuits and prevents an inmate from 
intentionally bypassing the administrative procedure.78  The Court 
characterizes the purpose of the PLRA as intending to “deal with what 
was perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation,” and it 
suggests simple exhaustion would permit an inmate to circumvent the 
administrative remedies intended to weed out such meritless cases.79  
The majority opinion explains that it could not support an interpretation 
that fails to “proscribe[] deliberate bypass”80 and concludes that it must 
create a procedural default rule, lest its reading of the rule be “unlike any 
other exhaustion scheme.”81
4.  PLRA Exhaustion Requirements Are Analogous to Habeas                     
Corpus Exhaustion Requirements 
Next, the majority opinion suggests that the PLRA exhaustion requirement 
is comparable to the exhaustion requirement in habeas petitions, which 
operate under a procedural default rule.  In habeas law, a prisoner must 
“exhaust state remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court.”82  
The purpose of this rule is to respect federalism and avoid the indecorum 
of a federal court overturning a state court decision without providing 
the state court an opportunity to correct its own error.83  In habeas law, 
violations of constitutional rights compared to when a federal court reviews a collateral 
attack on a sovereign state court’s judgment.”  Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 628 (9th 
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006). 
 77. When the court speaks of efficient resolution throughout the Woodford case, it 
speaks both of reducing the number of lawsuits and improving the quality of lawsuits. 
 78. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388–89.  The majority does not appear to offer a 
positive construction of why its interpretation of the PLRA reduces frivolous suits; nor 
does it discuss how a procedural default rule would eliminate intentional circumvention 
of the administrative process.  It merely suggests a simple exhaustion approach would 
not achieve either of these goals.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2390. 
 81. Id.  This section of the majority opinion does not explain in depth how a 
simple exhaustion rule promotes circumvention of procedural requirements.  However, 
the inference is that a prisoner could bypass administrative procedures by intentionally 
waiting until administrative time limits had expired and then filing his complaint in 
federal court. 
 82. Id. at 2386; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c) (2000). 
 83. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 536 U.S. 838, 
845 (1999) (“This rule of comity reduces friction between the state and federal court 
systems by avoiding the ‘unseem[liness]’ of a federal district court’s overturning a state-
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procedural default and administrative exhaustion are two separate doctrines; 
procedural default is the court-created sanction for failure to properly 
exhaust state court remedies.84  In both cases, remedies are correctly defined 
as simply “‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the 
reason for their unavailability.”85  The Court explains: 
[I]f state-court remedies are no longer available because the prisoner failed to 
comply with the deadline for seeking state-court review or for taking an appeal, 
those remedies are technically exhausted . . . but exhaustion in this sense does 
not automatically entitle the habeas petitioner to litigate his or her claims in 
federal court.  Instead, if the petitioner procedurally defaulted those claims, the 
prisoner generally is barred from asserting those claims in a federal habeas 
proceeding.86
The Court concludes that just as habeas law incorporates a preclusion 
rule following improper administrative exhaustion, so should the PLRA.87
5. The Language of the PLRA Supports a Proper Exhaustion Reading 
Last, the Court concludes the plain language of the PLRA does not 
support a simple exhaustion reading.  Without elaboration, the majority 
states that “saying a party may not sue in federal court until the party 
first pursues all available avenues of administrative review necessarily 
means that, if the party never pursues all available avenues of administrative 
review, the person will never be able to sue in federal court.”88
III.  THE MAJORITY OPINION INCORRECTLY INTERPRETS THE PLRA 
The creation of a new procedural bar is unfounded; the PLRA only 
requires simple exhaustion.  This section addresses each of the majority’s 
arguments in turn by offering criticism of the Court’s analysis and 
conclusions. 
court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the 
constitutional violation in the first instance.”)). 
 84. Id. at 2386–87. 
 85. Id. at 2387 (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996)). 
 86. Id. at 2387 (internal citations omitted) (citing Gray, 518 U.S. at 161 and 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991)). 
 87. Id. at 2386. 
 88. Id. at 2391. 




A.  The New Procedural Default Rule Does Not                                    
Enhance Administrative Authority 
One of the major principles promoted by an exhaustion requirement is 
the protection of administrative authority to correct errors in the system.89  
This rationale does not justify finding the PLRA requires a procedural 
default.  Barring a prisoner from filing suit because he missed administrative 
procedure deadlines does not protect prison officials’ authority any better 
than not banning such a suit. 
Prison officials already have discretion in most jurisdictions to address 
procedurally defective claims.90  The prison administration retains control 
over grievances if it so chooses.  In fact, a simple exhaustion rule does 
not excuse an inmate from filing a grievance.91  Most state prison systems 
already provide administrators with the discretion to hear procedurally 
defective claims.  Where such discretion exists, a prisoner must still file 
the complaint and await its rejection on procedural grounds prior to 
filing suit in federal court.92  Thus, if a prisoner ignores time restrictions 
and files a lawsuit after the time limits have expired, his lawsuit would 
not be redressable by the court because he would not have exhausted the 
administrative remedies required under the PLRA.93
For instance, Mr. Ngo’s situation indicates procedurally defective 
prison grievances promote administrative authority.  Here, Mr. Ngo filed 
a grievance with the California prison system pursuant to California’s 
requirements.94  However, the prison administrators rejected his claim 
because it was not timely.95  They could have instead reviewed the case 
 89. Id. at 2385.  The Court’s explanation of this reason for finding an administrative 
default rule is discussed more completely in Part II.D.1.  See supra notes 65–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 91. A simple exhaustion requirement would not encourage an inmate to file a 
timely grievance.  However, given the disadvantage to filing a stale complaint, there is 
still some incentive to file a timely grievance.  See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying 
text; see also infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 92. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2400. 
 93. Id. at n.10 (“If a prison regulation explicitly grants prison officials discretion to 
consider untimely or otherwise procedurally defective grievances, of course prison 
grievance remedies would still be ‘available,’ and thus unexhausted, if a prisoner had not 
even tried to file a grievance simply because it was untimely or otherwise procedurally 
defective.”).  The majority of jurisdictions provide prison administrators discretion to 
entertain untimely complaints.  Roosevelt III, supra note 47, at 1810.  It is not clear if all 
jurisdictions explicitly provide prison officials the discretion to hear untimely 
grievances.  However, the absence of such a provision would not necessarily preclude 
the power to do so. 
 94. Woodford, 126 S. Ct.  at 2383–84. 
 95. Id. 
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on its merits and provided relief.96  Mr. Ngo respected the authority of 
the prison system by filing his complaint and appealing its rejection.  
The majority does not make a clear argument as to why the procedural 
default rule is necessary to demonstrate respect for administrative 
authority in a case like Mr. Ngo’s.  If the Court considered the substance 
of Mr. Ngo’s lawsuit because he met the simple exhaustion requirements, it 
would still have shown appropriate respect for the officials’ authority.  
Even an exhaustion simpliciter requirement does what the majority calls 
for; it “provides prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their own 
errors.”97
Moreover, one wonders why it is better to provide the State with 
ultimate power and control over its prison grievances than to offer a 
backup method of correcting the system’s flaws and providing justice, 
knowing that some of the existing problems—including violations of 
basic constitutional rights—will not be resolved.  While the majority 
explains that the State has a strong interest in the administration of its 
prisons, this does not justify permitting continued harm, particularly 
where the interests of justice and the interests of State sovereignty can 
be served simultaneously otherwise. 
B.  The Procedural Default Rule Promotes Efficiency at the                     
Expense of Justice 
The majority opines that a procedural default rule promotes efficiency 
both by reducing the quantity of cases and improving the quality of the 
records in cases that prisoners do file.98  However, while a procedural 
default rule may actually reduce the number of lawsuits and establish 
quality records, such efficiency is not worth the price it commands.  This 
focus on efficiency ignores the true intent of the statute, which is to 
 96. “California, like the vast majority of state prison systems, explicitly gives 
prison administrators an opportunity to hear untimely or otherwise procedurally 
defective grievances.” Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
15, § 3084.3(c)). 
 97. Id. at 2387–88 (majority opinion). In citing the advantages of proper exhaustion, 
the majority explains the importance of allowing prisons to correct themselves.  Id.  
However, this goal appears to be achievable with either proper or simple exhaustion. 
 98. Id. at 2388.  The term efficiency in this Note addresses the speed with which a 
court can litigate a case, due to both the number of cases before it and the quality of the 
record in those cases.  For a detailed explanation of the Court’s position on efficiency 
resulting from the PLRA, see Part II.D, supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 




create a more efficient system by minimizing the number of frivolous 
lawsuits.99
1.  A Proper Exhaustion Requirement May Not Reduce the                       
Number of Cases Filed in Federal Courts 
The first part of the efficiency argument is that proper exhaustion will 
lead to fewer lawsuits.  However, a procedural default rule would not 
necessarily reduce the number of filings in federal court.  And even if 
such a rule does reduce the number of filings, one must balance this 
against the costs of doing so.  A study comparing filings before and after 
enactment of the PLRA showed a dramatic drop in the number of suits 
filed, even without a procedural default rule in place.100  The majority 
contends the likely causes of the reduction are two of the PLRA’s 
requirements: first, that the district court screen prisoner civil complaints 
before docketing whenever possible; and second, a prohibition on frequent 
filers from proceeding in forma pauperis.101
As the majority points out, the study cited by the dissent is correlative, 
not causal.102  Given this, it is not possible for the majority to know the 
additional provisions it cites are the cause of the reduced number of 
lawsuits.103  Regardless of which element of the PLRA is responsible for 
reducing the number of suits filed, it is clear the goal of efficiency has 
been met absent a procedural default rule.  Presumably, the reduction in 
suits has already allowed courts to proceed through litigation on the 
merits more efficiently, because when there are fewer cases filed, courts 
have more time to attend to evaluating their merits.  However, it is not 
entirely clear that a procedural default rule would actually significantly 
reduce the number of cases filed in federal court.104  It would likely 
reduce the number of cases ultimately litigated by dismissing all cases 
suffering a procedural error.  But even dismissals take up courts’ time 
 99. In other words, though the majority concedes the goal of the PLRA is to 
reduce the number of meritless lawsuits, it seems to attempt to achieve this end by 
reducing the total number of lawsuits.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388. 
 100. Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The number of prisoner civil rights suits 
filed in federal court was 41,679 in 1995, prior to the PLRA’s enactment.  Id.  In 2000 
the number had dropped to 25,504.  Id.  The ratio of prisoners filing suits also dropped 
from 37 for every 1000 inmates to only 19 per 1000 inmates during that same period.  Id.  
This reduction in prison litigation occurred before the first appellate decision to add a 
procedural default sanction to the PLRA.  Id. 
 101. Id. at 2388 n.4 (majority opinion); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A (2000). 
 102. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388 n.4. 
 103. See id. at 2400 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 104. It is not clear whether or not new cases that have violated the procedural 
default rule would be dismissed prior to placement on the docket, thereby potentially 
reducing crowding of the courts’ calendars, though presumably it would. 
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and resources.  Thus, a procedural default rule will not necessarily 
significantly improve efficiency by attempting to reduce the number of 
lawsuits. 
For instance, if a procedural default rule were in place in California at 
the time of Mr. Ngo’s case, it is not certain that he would have opted not 
to file his lawsuit in federal court.  The federal court would have had to 
dismiss it because of the administrative authority’s finding that there was 
a procedural error.  However, the dismissal itself would require court 
resources, suggesting no greater efficiency than a simple exhaustion rule 
would provide.105
Of course, if the courts screen the cases prior to docketing, a 
procedural default rule will reduce the number of cases.  The cost of 
doing so is the rejection of potentially meritorious cases which have 
suffered procedural errors.106  Efficiency should not prevail at the price 
of ignoring meritorious claims.  The goal of the PLRA is not a reduction 
in the overall number of suits; it is to keep frivolous suits out of the 
federal system.107  Otherwise, why allow a prisoner to bring a case into 
the federal court system at all?  Why not just prohibit all cases from 
judicial review?  The answer to these questions is in balancing proper 
administrative power with providing relief in cases where it was not 
 105. Of course one might argue that it takes much less time to dismiss a case for 
procedural error than to allow it to proceed through litigation.  However, the Court does 
not address whether or not federal courts will review the administrative authority’s 
finding of a procedural default.  It is certainly possible courts will hear arguments 
regarding the accuracy of the finding, requiring court resources to address the procedural 
question. 
 106. See Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388 n.4.  The dissenting opinion acknowledges 
that “the majority’s creation of a waiver sanction for procedural missteps during the 
course of exhaustion will have an even more significant effect in reducing the number of 
lawsuits filed by prisoners.”  Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The overall numbers 
might also decline if the procedural default rule effectively discouraged prisoners from 
filing federal lawsuits after procedural errors. 
 107. The majority complains that PLRA suits comprised between 8.3% and 9.8% of 
new filings in federal courts, which averaged to “one new prisoner case every other week 
for each of the nearly 1000 active and senior district judges across the country.”  Id. at 
2388 n.4 (majority opinion) (citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Judicial Facts and Figures, tbls. 1.1, 4.4, 4.6 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfacts 
figures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf).  However, the majority offers no basis upon 
which to conclude that this proportion is inappropriate.  The goal of the PLRA is to 
reduce frivolous lawsuits, not total numbers.  See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying 
text. 




properly granted.108  Thus, it is not clear that proper exhaustion via a 
procedural default rule is the best way to create efficiency in the quantity 
of suits before the federal court.  Although a procedural default rule will 
likely reduce the total number of suits to some degree, the gains in 
efficiency are not likely to be significant enough to warrant the resulting 
injustice.  The best way to keep the number of frivolous lawsuits down is 
to apply a simple exhaustion rule, as California did until the holding in 
this case.109
2.  The Procedural Default Rule Does Not Result in                                  
Higher Quality Lawsuits 
With respect to the quality of suits filed in court, the majority opinion 
explains: “When a grievance is filed shortly after the event giving rise to 
the grievance, witnesses can be identified and questioned while 
memories are still fresh, and evidence can be gathered and preserved.”110  
While this makes sense as a general rule, it is not clear that the time 
periods prescribed by the grievance procedures justify such a position.  
In fact, the suggestion leads one to wonder how long is too long.  The 
majority of administrative remedies appear to set a time limit of 
approximately three calendar weeks to file a complaint, but limits range 
from twenty-four hours to one year.111  Certainly a line must be drawn at 
 108. As one amicus brief points out, “engrafting a procedural default rule onto the 
PLRA would improperly interfere with a prisoner’s right to pursue valid constitutional 
claims.”  Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 5, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL 
282165 (“‘[P]risoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.’” (quoting 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996))).  The ABA Brief explains that “[t]he PLRA did not 
change the principle that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional 
claims of prison inmates.” Id. at 6.  Further, the dissent quotes Rodriguez v. United 
States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) (per curiam), in support of this notion: 
[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.  Deciding what competing 
values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective 
is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than 
effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the 
statute’s primary objective must be the law. 
Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 
525–26 (emphasis omitted)).  This is not to say that the legislative intent is irrelevant, but 
instead that it must be balanced against rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  Id. at 
2404 (“[T]he majority’s interpretation of the PLRA may cause the statute to be 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.”). 
 109. While an argument in favor of efficiency does not distinguish meritorious suits 
from frivolous ones, it is this writer’s contention that not doing so would ignore the 
PLRA’s goal of limiting the number of frivolous lawsuits. 
 110. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388. 
 111. Id. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal 
Services Organization, supra note 7, app. at 2–5. 
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some point, but imposition of an arbitrary limit does not mean that prison 
officials will be unable to locate witnesses, that memories will have faded, 
or that evidence will have been forever lost because a prisoner files a 
grievance after that time limit.112
Regardless of how long after the deadline an inmate files a grievance, 
prison officials have the discretion to address a prisoner’s grievance and 
create “an administrative record that is helpful to the court.”113  It is not 
clear, however, that officials must include any particular information in 
the record to improve case quality.  Whatever information arrives at the 
federal court from administrative exhaustion, even untimely administrative 
exhaustion, would certainly aid the courts, because any information is 
helpful.  Further, although the Court limits its discussion of quality to 
the record available, the quality of lawsuits rests just as much on the 
merits of the case.  Eliminating suits for procedural errors most certainly 
means eliminating meritorious suits deserving of judicial attention.114  
Thus, the overall quality of suits may actually be harmed by the 
procedural default rule. 
 112. Likewise, even where there is a short time limit for filing grievances, witnesses 
could have been transferred or released, memories could become inaccurate, and 
evidence could be lost. 
 113. See Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388; see also id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The majority of jurisdictions provide prison administrators discretion to entertain 
untimely complaints.  Roosevelt III, supra note 47, at 1810.  It is not clear if all jurisdictions 
explicitly provide prison officials the discretion to hear untimely grievances.  However, 
the absence of such a provision would not preclude the power to do so. 
 114. Roosevelt III, supra note 47, at 1814 (“[T]here is no reason to think that this 
[procedural default] approach would pick out frivolous suits, and some reason to think it 
would not.”); Slutsky, supra note 41, at 2318 (“The categorization of inmate litigation as 
frivolous, however, has led to significant limitations on both meritorious and trivial 
claims alike.”).  Professor Margo Schlanger conducted a study of inmate litigation 
trends.  She explains: “Numerous researchers who have conducted systematic reviews of 
case records have concluded that a large portion of inmates present serious claims that 
are supported factually, and that even most frivolous cases are neither fanciful, 
ridiculous, nor vexing.”  Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 
1692 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Though the Court limits 
its discussion of lawsuit quality to efficiency via accurate records before the court, this 
ignores the notion that the quality of a lawsuit is not only about efficient resolution.  
Instead, in discussing the quality of a suit, the Court should have considered the merits of 
the cases, even though this does not go directly to the issue of efficiency. 




C.  A Procedural Default Rule is Not Necessary to                                 
Combat Circumvention of the Administrative                                                   
Exhaustion Requirement 
The Court’s third major argument is that creating a procedural default 
rule creates an incentive for an inmate to comply with grievance 
procedure requirements.115  While the majority’s concern is logical, the 
dissenting opinion explains that an inmate typically lacks both the 
incentive and the capacity to intentionally circumvent administrative 
requirements.  Bypassing the grievance process provides little benefit to 
an inmate in the final substantive outcome of the complaint, because the 
federal court’s review of prison officials’ decision is de novo, offering 
no deference to prison officials.116  Additionally, prison officials can 
“thwart efforts by prisoners to avoid the grievance process by simply 
exercising their discretion to excuse any procedural defect in the presentation 
of the prisoners’ claims.”117  In other words, if prison officials were concerned 
that inmates were strategically bypassing administrative review, officials 
could opt to conduct the administrative review on the merits of the 
complaint.118
Despite the majority’s concern that simple exhaustion will lead to 
circumvention, there is no real strategic advantage to withholding an 
administrative claim.119  Proper exhaustion likewise allows an inmate to 
intentionally bypass administrative procedures by sabotaging his grievance 
on substantive grounds.120  “A rule that keys on procedural error, then, 
will not stop clever inmates who do not wish to give the grievance 
proceedings a fair shake; it will simply redirect their efforts into 
substantive issues. What it will do is catch the less sophisticated and less 
 115. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388.  The primary concern here is that a prisoner 
could intentionally miss filing deadlines without providing any explanation to 
strategically bypass the administrative process.  See id.; see also Brief of Petitioners, 
supra note 72, at 29 (“[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion mandate is rendered meaningless by a 
rule that permits prisoners to ‘exhaust’ state remedies by not complying with the 
available state process.”).  Though the opinion emphasizes circumvention of the 
administrative process via violations of time limits, the Court noted that an inmate could 
also get around the exhaustion requirements by ignoring or violating other procedural 
requirements as well.  Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2388.  For a more complete discussion of 
the Court’s rationale, see Part II.D.3.  See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 116. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.  This would have the additional 
bonus of demonstrating administrative authority in a situation where an inmate believed 
he was outwitting officials. 
 119. Roosevelt III, supra note 47, at 1810. 
 120. Id. 
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informed who are unable to satisfy complex and demanding procedural 
requirements.”121
This leaves just one major reason for a prisoner to intentionally 
circumvent the administrative exhaustion requirement: fear of retaliation 
from prison guards and officials.122  If an inmate delays in filing a grievance 
for fear of physical or psychological retaliation, the procedural default 
rule would discourage filing a complaint altogether, because an inmate 
would run out of time to state his grievance.  “By contrast, a simple 
exhaustion rule encourages inmates to report problems, and allows prison 
officials to determine whether they will seek to remedy them or decline 
to do so on the grounds that the information is too stale.”123  An inmate does 
not avoid exhaustion requirements under either the procedural default rule or 
the simple exhaustion rule.  However, grievances initially unfiled for fear 
of retaliation would never be heard under a procedural default rule.  
Under a simple exhaustion rule, on the other hand, an inmate would have 
time to build courage prior to filing his suit. 
Moreover, not only would a simple exhaustion rule not encourage 
circumvention of the administrative process, but because an inmate 
would ultimately have to file his grievance via the appropriate procedure 
prior to filing a federal action, this rule provides prison officials the 
opportunity to hear the case on its merits and resolve any problems.124  
As one amici notes, procedural default rules are designed to ensure 
finality to administrative and legal decisions, whereas prison grievance 
procedures serve as a management tool.125  They bring attention to 
officials who have the ability to correct problems in the system.126  This 
suggests that untimely grievances would serve an important function by 
promoting administrative autonomy and ensuring improvement in prison 
conditions, because they would still alert prison officials to problems. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2402 (2006).  There may be other reasons 
for attempting to bypass procedural requirements, including fear of retaliation from other 
inmates and embarrassment. 
 123. Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, supra note 7, at 
13–14. 
 124. State statutes of limitation for personal injury actions govern § 1983 actions, 
protecting federal officials in cases with stale facts.  Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 




D.  It is Improper to Analogize the Procedural Default Rule                             
in Habeas Corpus Law to the Exhaustion                                          
Requirement in the PLRA 
Finally, the Court analogizes the judicially-created procedural default 
rule with federal habeas corpus law.  Both require exhaustion at the state 
level prior to filing in federal court.127  In habeas petitions, if a prisoner 
makes a procedural error at the state level, including missing a deadline, 
the remedies available at the state level have been exhausted.128  Yet 
there, courts distinguish between exhaustion and barring future litigation 
on the issue.129  Because improper exhaustion of state remedies in habeas 
law precludes state prisoners from filing federal lawsuits, it is easy to see 
how the majority concluded that habeas law lends support to a procedural 
default sanction under the PLRA. 
However, a procedural bar may be appropriate in habeas law for 
reasons that are inapplicable to PLRA litigation.  First, habeas cases 
usually involve multiple issues, while PLRA litigation may be about a 
single incident.130  Where a prisoner files a habeas petition that includes 
a mixture of exhausted and unexhausted issues, he has the option of 
deleting and forfeiting the unexhausted claims and proceeding or requesting 
a stay so he may return to state courts to pursue the unexhausted claims 
 127. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2386; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c) (2000). 
 128. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387 (“In habeas, state-court remedies are described as 
having been ‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the reason for 
their unavailability.”); id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] habeas petitioner 
satisfies the statutory exhaustion requirement so long as state-court remedies are no 
longer available to him at the time of the federal-court filing, regardless of the reason for 
their unavailability.”).  For a more complete discussion of the Court’s explanation 
connecting the comparison between habeas law and the PLRA, see Part II.D.4.  See 
supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 129. For instance, if the California Supreme Court opts not to hear the merits of a 
case because of a procedural default at the state level, the state court remedies have been 
exhausted.  However, the federal courts will not take up the case, despite the exhaustion 
of all available state remedies, because the procedural errors resulted in a forfeiture of 
review. 
 130. For example, in Harper v. Laufenberg, No. 04-C-699-C, 2005 WL 79009 
(W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2005), prison officials dismissed a claim for procedural error where 
the prisoner complained that he was encouraged to commit suicide by a prison employee, 
but wrote that it was a “medical complaint.”  Id. at *1.  The Wisconsin Administrative 
Code allows only one issue on each complaint, and officials expressed confusion over 
whether this was a complaint about the actions of the prison employee or a grievance 
requesting psychological care.  Id. at *3.  Although his original complaint was filed 
within the fourteen-day statute of limitations, his resubmission to correct his error did not 
relate back to the original filing, and the examiner dismissed the case without reviewing 
its merits.  Id. 
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first.131  Thus, a habeas petitioner will still have his day in court with 
respect to the broader questions of both the appropriateness of the 
conviction and length of sentence.  However, a PLRA litigant who made 
a procedural misstep will not likely have his day in court at all; his entire 
claim will probably be barred because there is no administrative remedy 
available if the time limit expires and there is only one claim.132
Another difference between federal habeas petitions and claims by 
PLRA litigants is that the courts recognize that the quality of 
argumentation and the reason for non-exhaustion will vary between 
practitioners and pro se litigants in habeas petitions but not in PLRA 
cases.  Courts read pro se petitions in habeas cases more liberally than 
those drafted by attorneys so that the requirements do not become a trap 
for the unschooled pro se inmate.133  However, in cases brought under 
the PLRA, almost all litigants are pro se and must not only meet the 
court procedural requirements, but must first navigate the administrative 
procedures set forth by their prison systems.134  This allows correctional 
 131. BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS PRACTITIONER GUIDE § 64 (2006) (citing 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982)).  A habeas corpus petition operates as 
follows: The prisoner appeals his conviction or length of prison sentence with state 
appellate courts.  He may provide a number of reasons to justify his claims, such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, or improper admission of 
evidence.  Next, he files a petition for review at the state supreme court level.  See id.     
§ 6.  He must file the petition within the prescribed period of time to exhaust the 
available remedies.  See id. § 9.  If the state supreme court declines to review the appeal, 
the federal courts consider the remedies at the state level to be exhausted.  See id. § 6.  
However, if the petition to federal court for habeas review includes issues not raised 
anywhere at the state level, those claims have not been exhausted.  This results in a 
mixed petition.  See id. §§ 27, 64.  Federal courts may not address mixed petitions for 
reasons of comity, not jurisdictional limits.  Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515, 518–19 
(1982)). 
 132. Some prison grievances include more than one claim and are called mixed 
complaints.  The PLRA is silent on how to address these cases.  For a thoughtful 
discussion of how to approach a mixed complaint, see Slutsky, supra note 41, at 2315–
18.  Some prisons require inmates to file separate forms for each complaint to avoid 
having any mixed complaints to address.  See Brief for the American Civil Liberties 
Union et al., supra note 7, at 26–27 (citing Harper v. Laufenberg, No. 04-C-699-C, 2005 
WL 79009, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2005) (finding a prisoner’s complaint to be 
procedurally inadequate for failing to file separate forms for each complaint)). 
 133. Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[F]or the purposes of 
exhaustion [in habeas corpus petition cases], pro se petitions are held to a more lenient 
standard than counseled petitions.”); see also Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[F]or purposes of exhaustion, counseled petitions in state 
court may, and sometimes should, be read differently from pro se petitions.”). 
 134. See Harper, 2005 WL 79009, at *3.  In Harper, once the prisoner turned in the 
procedurally defective grievance, he had sealed his fate.  Even though he filed the 




officials to design the grievance procedures in a way that makes it 
difficult for an inmate to maneuver properly so he may obtain relief,135 a 
decidedly different result than one which gives leniency to a pro se 
applicant attempting to exhaust the required remedies.  Even if a court 
were to read the claim’s contents liberally, under the holding of 
Woodford it is not likely a court would consider the substantive merits of 
the complaint.  The Woodford decision mandates strict adherence to the 
administrative procedures prior to filing suit at all; a court is not likely to 
complaint within the prescribed statute of limitations, the procedural problem precluded 
relief.  If he appealed the original rejection, he would have lost because the complaint 
was unclear as to whether it was regarding one action or two actions.  Moreover, it 
would have been impossible to meet the timeliness requirement because he filed the 
grievance at the end of the permissible term and there was “no provision in the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code that require[d] an institution complaint examiner to 
accept a revised complaint filed after the 14-day period . . . as having been filed on the 
date the original complaint was submitted or returned.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In other 
words, the fourteen-day period began tolling on the date of the incident, and the prisoner 
had to file a procedurally adequate complaint within that time.  One amicus brief 
explains: “[T]he procedures that prisoners are required to navigate are not restricted to 
compliance with short filing deadlines, but they may encompass a variety of pleading 
and other formal requirements.”  Brief of the American Bar Association, supra note 108, 
at 7.  The ABA Brief cites Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2002), as “holding 
that exhaustion has not occurred unless the prisoner files a grievance in the place, at the 
time, and with the level of detail required by the prison administrative rules.”  Id. (citing 
Strong, 297 F.3d at 649).  Further, the PLRA applies to local jails and detention centers, 
as well as prisons.  “[T]he smaller and more local the facility, the more difficult it is to 
obtain a copy of its grievance policy.”  Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services 
Organization, supra note 7, at 12.  Thus, detainees must determine what the rules of the 
particular institution housing them require in order to properly exhaust the administrative 
remedies. 
 135. Brief of the American Bar Association, supra note 108, at 7.  Adult inmates, a 
large number of whom are illiterate or have poor reading skills, may have difficulty 
complying with the administrative exhaustion requirements.  See Brief for the Jerome N. 
Frank Legal Services Organization, supra note 7, at 20 (“The National Adult Literacy 
Survey (NALS), conducted in 1992 by the United States Department of Education, 
concluded that the vast majority of inmates—seven out of ten—operate at the lowest two 
levels of literacy on a five-level scale.”) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, LITERACY BEHIND PRISON WALLS:  PROFILES OF THE ADULT 
PRISON POPULATION FROM THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY xviii (1994)).  
Further, indigent inmates have limited access to legal information within the strict time 
limits of the grievance procedures.  Id. at 21–22.  Even when an inmate can determine 
the appropriate procedure, his complaint may be rejected because prison conditions do 
not allow him to meet the requirements.  For instance, in Keys v. Craig, 160 Fed. Appx. 
125 (3d Cir. 2005), an inmate proceeded through two levels of administrative review 
properly.  Id. at 126.  However, when he reached the third level, he did not attach copies 
of required documents.  Id.  He explained that the prison took two weeks to make the 
photocopies for him, so he sent the remaining paperwork ahead for appeal while he 
waited for the copies.  Id.  When the copies arrived, he forwarded them attached to a note 
explaining their delay.  Id.  The court held this action to be procedurally defective and 
dismissed his federal lawsuit.  Id. 
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consider the substantive claims if the procedural requirements have not 
been met.136
Finally, the judicially created habeas corpus procedural default rule is 
distinguishable because it intends to protect state court powers while the 
Woodford rule intends merely to protect the powers of an administrative 
agency.  The Court has recognized the difference between a procedural 
default rule in habeas corpus petitions and administrative exhaustion.137  
However, the reason for application of the procedural default rule in 
habeas law is one of comity and federalism; it does not apply in the 
PLRA administrative exhaustion context.  The Court explains: 
Without the [procedural default] rule, a federal district court would be able to do 
in habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas would offer 
state prisoners whose custody was supported by independent and adequate state 
grounds an end run around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to 
undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its laws.138
The interests of a State in effectuating its own criminal justice system 
cannot be said to equate with the interests of the State in running its 
prison system, a mere subset of the criminal justice system.  Yet that is 
what the Woodford v. Ngo holding seems to do.  Section 1983 claims 
simply “do not raise the same concerns about the autonomy of state 
courts as habeas corpus challenges to the confinement itself.”139  After 
administrative exhaustion, §1983 cases are reviewed de novo, providing 
no deference to the prison administration on issues of law or fact.140  The 
purpose of these claims is “not to obtain direct review of an order entered in 
the grievance procedure, but to obtain redress for an alleged violation of 
 136. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 137. The Court in Woodford discusses both administrative exhaustion and the 
procedural default rule in habeas cases as being the same in practical terms despite using 
different terminology.  See Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006) (“In practical 
terms, the law of habeas, like administrative law, requires proper exhaustion . . . .  The 
law of habeas, however, uses terminology that differs from that of administrative law.”). 
 138. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). 
 139. Brief of the American Bar Association, supra note 108, at 14 (citing Wilkinson 
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005)).  The Court in Wilkinson explained: 
Our earlier cases, however, have already placed the States’ important comity 
considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to 
vindicate federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded that prisoners may 
bring their claims without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long as their 
suits, if established, would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement. 
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 84 (2005). 
 140. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 




federal law committed by state corrections officials.”141  Unlike habeas 
cases, PLRA cases “bear no resemblance to appellate review of lower 
court decisions,”142 suggesting that concerns of comity and federalism 
are also not equally warranted.  It would therefore be improper to establish a 
proper exhaustion requirement for PLRA litigants simply because one 
exists for habeas petitioners.143
E.  The Plain Text of the PLRA Supports Finding a                                
Simple Exhaustion Requirement 
While the majority opinion emphasizes an underlying public policy 
rationale, it is significant to note what the majority opinion does not 
provide as a positively constructed reason for creating a procedural 
default: the statute’s plain text.144  In fact, “[t]he majority does not claim 
that the plain language of the statute dictates its decision, but rather that 
the text ‘strongly suggests’ that the PLRA includes a procedural default 
sanction.”145  In determining the meaning of the statute’s plain text, one 
need look no further than case law in which the Court has provided “a 
definitive interpretation of the language in one statute” which is “nearly 
identical [to the] language in another statute.”146  In such an instance, the 
Court interprets language in the second statute identically, unless there is 
some “clear indication in the text or legislative history” that it should not 
do so.147  The dissent provides such an analysis in its opinion.148
Comparing the language of the habeas corpus statute in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 to the language of the PLRA, the dissent concludes that the 
PLRA, like the habeas statute, creates only simple exhaustion.149  The 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. The habeas analogy simply does not work: 
 The policy aims served by the procedural default doctrine in the habeas 
context . . . are generally irrelevant to suits under the PLRA.  Exhaustion via 
neglect is impossible; deliberate bypass could be achieved by other means, 
given the lack of collateral consequences; and the federalism concern that 
drove the Wainwright Court to identify state courts as preferred forums is 
absent.  The habeas analogy is simply not a very good one. 
Roosevelt III, supra note 47, at 1811. 
 144. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2391. 
 145. Id. at 2395 n.2 
 146. Id. at 2395. 
 147. Id. (referencing United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997)). 
 148. Id. at 2395–96. 
 149. Id.  Though habeas law carries with it a procedural default, this is the result of 
judge-made law, not a plain reading of the language.  Id. at 2396 n.5.  Recall that the 
majority and dissenting opinions concur that the habeas statute itself does not create such 
a procedural default.  See note 131 and accompanying text.  Even though the Court 
focuses on exhaustion requirements when it defines the terms of the habeas statute, the 
agreement of the majority and dissenting opinions that the plain language of the habeas 
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habeas statute bars review “unless it appears that . . . the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”150  The PLRA 
prohibits filing a suit in federal court “until such administrative remedies 
as are available are exhausted.”151  Both statutes call for exhausting the 
remedies available prior to taking action in federal court.  The only real 
difference in the statutes is that one uses the word “unless,” while the other 
uses the word “until.”  Justice Stevens argues “[t]he word ‘until’ indicates a 
temporal condition whereas the word ‘unless’ would have been more 
appropriate for a procedural bar.”152
The definition of unless is “except on condition that,” as in: “[It] would 
not have been destroyed [unless] a regiment . . . had been sent.”153  The 
habeas law could properly be read to mean that federal courts will not 
honor the petition except on condition that the applicant has exhausted 
his state-court remedies.  Said another way, federal courts will only 
accept a habeas petition if the applicant has already met all exhaustion 
requirements.  The definition of until is “up to the time that” or “before 
the time that.”154  Thus, the PLRA requirement should be read to mean that 
an inmate may not file a complaint in federal court before exhausting 
available administrative remedies.  Put another way, an inmate cannot 
proceed in federal court up until the time that he has exhausted the state 
grievance requirements, or the inmate may only file a federal lawsuit 
after he has exhausted administrative remedies. 
While the distinction may not appear to make much difference in 
meaning upon first glance, it is quite significant.  The majority takes the 
position that until and unless are essentially synonymous: “[S]aying a 
party may not sue in federal court until the party first pursues all 
available avenues of administrative review necessarily means that, if the 
party never pursues all available avenues of administrative review, the 
person will never be able to sue in federal court.”155  The dissent does 
not argue that an inmate should be permitted to bring suit without 
pursuing all available administrative remedies.  The dissent’s explanation of 
statute calls for simple exhaustion bolsters the position that the plain language of the 
PLRA also calls for simple exhaustion. 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 152. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2396. 
 153. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 2503 (1986) (ellipses in original). 
 154. Id. at 2513. 
 155. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2391. 




prison administrations’ ability to hear grievances after the expiration of 
the statutory time period cuts against this reading of its position. 
The word unless connotes propriety in a way until does not.  Unless 
indicates a person who has not followed administrative procedure to 
exhaust a claim cannot later file a lawsuit. Until suggests the law does 
not limit whether or not a lawsuit may be filed; rather, it addresses when 
the suit may be filed.  Moreover, even interpreting until and unless to be 
synonymous in meaning, no one suggests that the federal habeas statute’s 
exhaustion requirement incorporates a default sanction.156  The most 
appropriate way to read the statute is to read it as requiring simple 
exhaustion. 
Ultimately, none of the majority’s main arguments adequately justifies 
creating a procedural default rule.  Simple exhaustion protects administrative 
authority and promotes efficiency by minimizing the number of lawsuits 
filed while ensuring their quality.  Simple exhaustion comports with the 
goals of the PLRA without creating opportunities for circumventing its 
requirements.  The existence of a procedural default rule in habeas cases 
is inapposite to interpreting the language of the PLRA, and the plain text 
of the PLRA suggests the correct reading is one of exhaustion simpliciter. 
IV.  THE PROPER READING OF THE PLRA EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 
Part IV discusses the simple exhaustion reading more fully.  It applies 
the exhaustion simpliciter rule to the facts of the Woodford v. Ngo case, 
demonstrating why simple exhaustion, rather than proper exhaustion, 
would best protect the rights granted to inmates under the laws of the 
United States and ensure justice. 
The Woodford dissent offers an effective interpretation which 
incorporates a simple exhaustion reading, as dictated by the statute’s 
plain text, while discouraging intentional circumvention of exhaustion 
requirements.  Courts could punish a prisoner who intentionally bypasses 
state administrative remedies without imposing the same sanction on an 
inmate “who make[s] reasonable, good-faith efforts to comply with 
relevant administrative rules but, out of fear of retaliation, a reasonable 
mistake of law, or simple inadvertence, make[s] some procedural misstep 
 156. Id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[S]tate-court remedies are ‘exhausted’ for 
the purposes of the federal habeas statute so long as ‘they are no longer available, 
regardless of the reason for their unavailability’ . . . .  [T]he exhaustion requirement in 
the federal habeas statute does not incorporate a procedural default sanction.”); see also 
supra notes 127–43 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between federal 
habeas law and the PLRA). 
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along the way.”157  By dismissing suits where an inmate clearly engaged 
in strategic circumvention, federal courts would send a clear message 
that administrative authority should be taken seriously without imposing 
draconian punishments.158
The goals of the PLRA are best met by utilizing exhaustion simpliciter.  
In fact, the Court’s creation of a procedural default rule “bars litigation 
at random, irrespective of whether a claim is meritorious or frivolous.”159  
Consider the facts of the instant case.  Though prison officials initially 
prevented Mr. Ngo from engaging in religious activities six months 
before he filed his first grievance, the prohibition continued beyond its 
initial invocation.  Mr. Ngo’s grievance complained of his inability to 
“participate in Catholic observances, such as Confession, Holy Week 
services, and Bible study.”160  When prison officials rejected this grievance 
as untimely, he filed a second complaint, explaining that the denial of 
capacity to participate in religious activities was ongoing and therefore 
within the fifteen-day limit.161  The prison rejected this grievance as 
untimely as well.162
Assuming the prison officials were accurate in their reading of the 
administrative rule time limitations as applying to the first instance, the 
procedural default rule bars Mr. Ngo from having his grievance heard in 
federal court, despite the fact that it may be a violation both of § 1983 of 
the Civil Rights Act and of his First Amendment right to the free 
 157. Woodford,126 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 2393 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“I do not believe that Congress desired a system in which prisoners could 
elect to bypass prison grievance systems without consequences.  Administrative law, 
however, contains well established exceptions to exhaustion.”) (emphasis added).  Even 
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, appears to recognize there are cases in which 
the majority’s strict procedural default rule should not apply, including cases where there 
are inadequate or unavailable administrative remedies and cases in which the procedural 
default rule would result in injustice.  Id. at 2393. 
 158. The dissent suggests any intentional circumvention can be overcome with 
basic abstention principles.  See supra note 13. 
 159. Woodford,126 S. Ct. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also 
points out that this strict rule will disproportionately reward inmates who file suits 
repeatedly: “[P]risoners who file frivolous claims are probably more likely to be repeat 
filers, and to learn the ins and outs of all procedural requirements.”  Id. at 2401 n.13. 
 160. Id. at 2403.  The Catholic Church encourages participation in regular confession to 
clear one’s conscience prior to receiving Holy Communion.  CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1385 (U.S. Catholic Conference, Inc. ed. & trans., Ligouri Pubs. 
1994) (“Anyone conscious of a grave sin must receive the sacrament of Reconciliation 
before coming to communion.”). 
 161. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2403. 
 162. Id. 




exercise of religion.163  Mr. Ngo did not wait six months to file his 
complaint to thwart consideration by prison administration and thereby 
undercut their administrative authority; he filed his grievance twice in 
hopes that its merits would be considered.  Moreover, Mr. Ngo’s complaint 
was not frivolous; it involved concerns about his religious freedoms.  
His complaint did not intentionally circumvent the administrative process 
for strategic advantage.  If anything, Mr. Ngo attempted to navigate the 
California Code of Regulations to file his complaint in a timely manner, 
within fifteen days of being denied the ability to engage in religious activities.  
Finally, no one appears to argue that Mr. Ngo failed to exhaust all 
available administrative remedies, as required under the PLRA.  Instead, 
this decision merely holds that because the prison administration rejected 
his complaint on procedural grounds, he is not entitled to have his case 
heard in federal court.  Mr. Ngo’s case warranted a different outcome.  It 
is not difficult to imagine the impact this holding will have on other prisoner 
complaints, particularly those never filed because the inmate with the 
grievance is not savvy enough to navigate the administrative process or 
fears retaliation for doing so.164
 163. Of course, an argument could be made that the administration responsible for 
receiving the grievance improperly applied the statute of limitations.  Absent a review by 
a federal court, however, Mr. Ngo will not be able to find relief. 
 164. Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 
July 27, 2005).  Mr. Zick was repeatedly beaten and kicked by other inmates, raped at 
least once, and once beaten so badly that it resulted in a seizure-like reaction.  Id. at *1.  
Prison employees had knowledge of the violence because video cameras captured the 
incidents.  Id. at *1–2.  Some prison employees would handcuff one juvenile so other 
inmates could beat him.  Id. at *2.  Unlike Mr. Ngo, Mr. Zick did not file a grievance 
during his stay in the juvenile facility out of fear of retaliation.  Id.  Mr. Zick’s mother 
and legal guardian, Cathy Minix, complained to the staff about her son’s treatment and 
ultimately took her complaint to a juvenile magistrate judge who reported the situation to 
the governor’s office, resulting in Zick’s eventual release.  Id.  She filed a lawsuit on his 
behalf in both their names; the district court dismissed the case because Mr. Zick did not 
exhaust the available procedures.  Id. at *2, *7 (“[T]he exhaustion issue disposes of the 
federal claims.”).  The court noted that Mrs. Minix’s attempts to notify authorities of the 
detention center’s conditions were insufficient in part because they “did not issue within 
anything near the prescribed time,” and because “her communications didn’t comply 
with the general time constraints built into the grievance process, which allow investigation 
and corrective action while evidence and memories are still available.”  Id. at *4.  Putting 
aside whether or not it should be appropriate for a parent to file a grievance on behalf of 
her minor child, the fact that Mrs. Minix filed the complaint after the forty-eight hour 
time limit had expired played a factor in the court’s decision.  Under the Seventh 
Circuit’s reading of the PLRA at the time, a procedural default rule applied; thus, even 
had Mr. Zick filed a complaint with the detention center after the forty-eight hour time 
limit expired, a federal lawsuit would have been barred.  Here was a case, in which the 
prison officials were aware of the inadequate conditions of confinement, and in which a 
crusading mother’s complaint reached all the way to the Governor’s office, and still the 
officials did not change those conditions.  A Department of Justice investigation ultimately 
concluded that the juvenile facility violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights 
of its residents, in part by failing to “adequately protect the juveniles in its care from 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Woodford v. Ngo creation of a procedural default rule provides 
ample opportunities for frivolous lawsuits without protecting the interests of 
inmates who have meritorious cases but are unfamiliar with the proper 
grievance procedures.  In Mr. Ngo’s case, though he filed a complaint within 
fifteen days of what he considered to be a violation of his civil rights, the 
finding of a procedural error precluded him from having his day in court.  
He did not make a strategic decision to undercut prison authority.  He 
attempted to follow the grievance rules.  But because of this new 
procedural default rule, Mr. Ngo will never get the justice he deserves. 
In engrafting a procedural default rule onto the PLRA, the Supreme 
Court has created an unnecessarily draconian scheme that does not meet 
the PLRA’s intended goals.  A procedural default rule prohibits inmates 
from filing meritorious claims in federal court if they do not follow the 
precise requirements required by their prisons’ administrative procedures.  
Whether a prisoner’s freedom of religious exercise has been impinged or 
he is one of the nearly one million prisoners who have suffered rape while 
in confinement, his remedy will be limited by his savvy in navigating 
these.  Requiring proper exhaustion may reduce the number of lawsuits 
filed in federal court, but it will also prevent inhumane prison conditions 
from ever being corrected. 
 
 
harm.”  Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, supra note 7, at 19 
n.19 (quoting Letter from Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to 
Mitch Daniels, now Governor of the State of Indiana 2, 3 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-9-05.pdf).  The 
same letter “concluded that, ‘[th]e dysfunctional grievance system at South Bend contributes 
to the State’s failure to ensure a reasonably safe environment.’”  Id. at 19.  It was only 
after this Department of Justice investigation that the juvenile facility changed its errant 
ways.  But it was too late for Mr. Zick, who lost the opportunity to challenge the 
conditions of his confinement.  If instead the court applied a simple exhaustion rule, Mr. 
Zick would have been able to report the abuse to prison authorities after the forty-eight 
hour time limit expired.  If prison officials opted to evaluate the complaint on its merits, 
they could have exercised their authority and potentially corrected a grievous condition.  
Such relief may have made it unnecessary for Mr. Zick to file a federal suit at all.  
Alternatively, if prison officials opted not to hear the case, Mr. Zick would have been 
able to file suit.  Once the prison officials rejected his claim and each subsequent 
appeal, he would have met the simple exhaustion requirement, as his efforts would 
have eliminated all available remedies.  The application of a procedural default rule 
failed Mr. Zick, and it will fail other prisoners like him, afraid to step forward initially 
for fear of retaliation. 
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